Abstract. Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that fulfills both the functions of digital signature and public key encryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-encryption approach. In this paper, we address a question whether it is possible to construct a hybrid signcryption scheme in the certificateless setting. This question seems to have never been addressed in the literature. We answer the question positively in this paper. In particular, we extend the concept of signcryption tag-KEM to the certificateless setting. We show how to construct a certificateless signcryption scheme using certificateless signcryption tag-KEM. We also give an example of certificateless signcryption tag-KEM.
Introduction
Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication are the important requirements for many cryptographic applications. A traditional approach to achieve these requirements is to signthen-encrypt the message. Signcryption, first proposed by Zheng [38] , is a cryptographic primitive that fulfills both the functions of digital signature and public key encryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-encryption approach. Several efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed since 1997 [5, 19, 22, 29, 30, 32, 36, 39] . The original scheme in [38] is based on the discrete logarithm problem but no security proof is given. Zheng's original scheme was only proven secure by Baek, Steinfeld, and Zheng [4] who described a formal security model in a multi-user setting. In above traditional signcryption schemes, the public key of a user is essentially a random bit string picked from a given set. So, the signcryption does not provide the authorization of the user by itself. This problem can be solved via a certificate which provides an unforgeable and trusted link between the public key and the identity of the user by the signature of a certificate authority (CA), and there is a hierarchical framework that is called public key infrastructure (PKI) to issue and manage certificates. However, the certificates management including revocation, storage, distribution and the computational cost of certificates verification is the main difficulty against traditional PKI.
To simplify key management procedures of traditional PKI, Shamir [33] proposed the concept of identity-based cryptography (IBC) in 1984. The idea of IBC is to get rid of certificates by allowing the user's public key to be any binary string that uniquely identifies the user. Examples of such strings include email addresses and IP addresses. Several practical identity-based signature (IBS) schemes have been devised since 1984 [18, 20] , but a satisfying identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme only appeared in 2001 [10] . It was devised by Boneh and Franklin and cleverly uses bilinear maps (the Weil or Tate pairing) over supersingular elliptic curves. Subsequently, several identitybased signcryption (IBSC) schemes are also proposed [7, 11, 12, 14, 26, 27, 28] . The main practical benefit of IBC is in greatly reducing the need for the public key certificates. But IBC uses a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG). The PKG generates the secret keys of all of its users, so a user can decrypt only if the PKG has given a secret key to it (so, certification is implicit), hence reduces the amount of storage and computation. On the other hand, the dependence on the PKG who can generate all users' private keys inevitably causes the key escrow problem to the IBC. For example, the PKG can decrypt any ciphertext in an IBE scheme. Equally problematical, the PKG could forge any user's signature in an IBS scheme.
To solve the key escrow problem in the IBC, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] introduced a new paradigm called certificateless cryptography. The certificateless cryptography does not require the use of certificates and yet does not have the built-in key escrow feature of IBC. It is a model for the use of public key cryptography that is intermediate between traditional PKI and IBC. A certificateless system still makes use of a trusted third party which is called the key generating center (KGC). By way of contrast to the PKG in the IBC, the KGC does not have access to the user's private key. Instead, the KGC supplies a user with a partial private key that the KGC computes from the user's identity and a master key. The user then combines the partial private key with some secret information to generate the actual private key. The system is not identitybased, because the public key is no longer computable from a user's identity. When Alice wants to send a message to Bob in a certificateless system, she must obtain Bob's public key. However, no authentication of Bob's public key is necessary and no certificate is required. In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [6] introduced the notion of certificateless signcryption (CLSC) and proposed an efficient scheme.
The practical way to perform secrecy communication for large messages is to use hybrid encryption that separates the encryption into two parts: one part uses public key techniques to encrypt a one-time symmetric key; the other part uses the symmetric key to encrypt the actual message. In such a construction, the public key part of the algorithm is known as the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) while the symmetric key part is known as the data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). A formal treatment of this paradigm originates in the work of Cramer and Shoup [15] . The resulting KEM-DEM hybrid encryption paradigm has received much attention in recent years [1, 24, 25] . It is very attractive as it gives a clear separation between the various parts of the cipher allowing for modular design. In [1] , Abe, Gennaro, and Kurosawa introduced tag-KEM which takes as input a tag in KEM. Bentahar et al. [8] extended KEM into identity-based and certificateless settings and gave generic constructions of identity-based KEM (IB-KEM) and certificateless KEM (CL-KEM). Chen et al. [13] proposed an efficient IB-KEM based on the Sakai-Kasahara key construction [31] . Kiltz and Galindo [23] proposed a direct construction of IB-KEM in the standard model, based on Waters's IBE scheme [35] . Huang and Wong [21] proposed a generic construction of CL-KEM in the standard model.
-Signcrypt: This algorithm takes as input params, a plaintext message m ∈ M, the sender's full private key S IDs , identity ID s and public key P K IDs , and the receiver's identity ID r and public key P K IDr , and outputs a ciphertext σ ∈ C. -Unsigncrypt: This algorithm takes as input params, a ciphertext σ, the sender's identity ID s and public key P K IDs , and the receiver's full private key S IDr , identity ID r and public key P K IDr , and outputs a plaintext m or a failure symbol ⊥ if σ is an invalid ciphertext.
We make the consistency constraint that if
Barbosa and Farshim [6] defines the security notions for CLSC schemes. A CLSC scheme should satisfy confidentiality (indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2)) and unforgeability (existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks (UF-CMA)). For the stronger notion of insider security, we use the notion of strong existential unforgeability (sUF-CMA). The strong existential unforgeability means that an adversary wins if it outputs a valid message/signcryption pair (m, σ) for identities ID s and ID r and the signcryption σ was not returned by the signcryption oracle when queried on the message m. As in [11, 12] , we do not consider attacks targeting signcryptions where the identities of the sender and receiver are the same. That is, we disallow such queries to relevant oracles and do not accept this type of signcryption as a valid forgery.
There are two types of adversaries, Type I and Type II. A Type I adversary models an attacker which is a common user of the system and is not in possession of the KGC's master secret key. But it is able to adaptively replace users'public keys with (valid) public keys of its choice. A Type II adversary models an honest-but-curious KGC who knows the KGC's master secret key. But it cannot replace users' public keys.
For the confidentiality, we consider two games "IND-CCA2-I" and "IND-CCA2-II" where a Type I adversary A I and a Type II adversary A II interact with their "challenger" in these two games, respectively. Note that the challenger keeps a history of "query-answer" while interacting with the attackers. Now we describe the two games.
IND-CCA2-I: This is the game in which A I interacts with the "challenger": Initial: The challenger runs (params, msk) ← Setup(1 k ) and gives params to A I . The challenger keeps master secret key msk to itself.
Phase 1: The adversary A I can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner.
-Extract partial private key: The adversary A I chooses an identity ID. The challenger computes D ID ←Extract-Partial-Private-Key(params, msk, ID) and sends D ID to A I . -Extract private key: The adversary A I chooses an identity ID. The challenger first computes D ID ←Extract-Partial-Private-Key(params, msk, ID) and then computes (x ID , P K ID ) ← Generate-User-Keys(params, ID). Finally, it sends the result of S ID ←Set-Private-Key(x ID , D ID ) to A I . The adversary is not allowed to query any identity for which the corresponding public key has been replaced. This restriction is imposed due to the fact that it is unreasonable to expect that the challenger is able to provide a full private key for a user for which it does not know the secret value. -Request public key: The adversary A I chooses an identity ID. The challenger computes (x ID , P K ID ) ←Generate-User-Keys(params, ID) and sends P K ID to A I . -Replace public key: A I may replace a public key P K ID with a value chosen by it.
-Signcryption queries: The adversary A I chooses a m, a sender's identity ID s and a receiver's identity ID r , the challenger finds S IDs from its "query-answer" list, computes σ ← Signcrypt(params, m, S IDs , ID s , P K IDs , ID r , P K IDr ), and returns σ to A I . Note that, it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the sender's secret value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide it. We disallow queries where ID s = ID r . -Unsigncryption queries: A I chooses a σ, a sender's identity ID s and a receiver's identity ID r , the challenger finds S IDr from its "query-answer" list, computes Unsigncrypt(params, σ, ID s , P K IDs , S IDr , ID r , P K IDr ), and returns the result to A I . The result is either a plaintext message m or ⊥. Note that, it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the receiver's secret value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide it. We also disallow queries where ID s = ID r .
Challenge: The adversary A I decides when Phase 1 ends. A I generates two equal length plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ), a sender's identity ID * s , and a receiver's identity ID * r on which it wishes to be challenged. Note that ID * r should not be queried to extract a private key in Phase 1. Note also that ID * r cannot be equal to an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has been extracted. The challenger picks a random bit δ from {0, 1}, computes
, and returns σ * to A I . Phase 2: The adversary A I can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase 1. The same rule is applied here: A I cannot extract the private key for ID * r . A I cannot extract the partial private key for ID * r if the public key of this identity has been replaced before the challenge phase. In addition, A I cannot make a unsigncryption query on σ * under ID * s and ID * r , unless the public key P K ID * s or P K ID * r has been replaced after the challenge phase. Guess: A I produces a bit δ and wins the game if δ = δ. The advantage of A I is defined to be
where Pr[δ = δ] denotes the probability that δ = δ.
IND-CCA2-II: This is the game in which A II interacts with the "challenger":
The challenger runs (params, msk) ← Setup(1 k ) and gives both params and msk to A II .
Phase 1: The adversary A II can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner. Note that we do not need Extract partial private key since A II can computes partial private keys by itself.
-Extract private key: Same to the IND-CCA2-I game.
-Request public key: Same to the IND-CCA2-I game. Challenge: The adversary A II decides when Phase 1 ends. A II generates two equal length plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ), a sender's identity ID * s , and a receiver's identity ID * r on which it wishes to be challenged. ID * r should not be queried to extract a private key in Phase 1. The challenger picks a random bit δ from {0, 1}, computes
, and returns σ * to A II .
Phase 2: The adversary A II can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase 1. A II cannot extract the private key for ID * r . In addition, A II cannot make a unsigncryption query on σ * under ID * s and ID * r , unless the public key P K ID * s or P K ID * r has been replaced after the challenge phase.
Guess: A II produces a bit δ and wins the game if δ = δ. The advantage of A II is defined to be
where Pr[δ = δ] denotes the probability that δ = δ. Notice that the adversary is allowed to extract the private key of ID * s in the IND-CCA2-I and IND-CCA2-II games. This condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of insider security for confidentiality of signcryption [3] . On the other hand, it ensures the forward security of the scheme, i.e. confidentiality is preserved in case the sender's private key becomes compromised.
For the strong existential unforgeability, we consider two games "sUF-CMA-I" and "sUF-CMA-II" where a Type I adversary F I and a Type II adversary F II interact with their "challenger" in these two games, respectively. Note that the challenger keeps a history of "query-answer" while interacting with the attackers. These two games are described as follows.
sUF-CMA-I: This is the game in which F I interacts with the "challenger": Initial: The challenger runs (params, msk) ← Setup(1 k ) and gives params to F I . The challenger keeps master secret key msk to itself.
Attack: The adversary F I performs a polynomially bounded number of queries just like in the IND-CCA2-I game.
Forgery: F I produces a quaternion (m * , σ * , ID * s , ID * r ). Note that ID * s should not be queried to extract a private key. Note also that ID * s cannot be equal to an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has been extracted. In addition, σ * was not returned by the signcryption oracle on the input (m * , ID * s , ID * r ) during Attack stage. F I wins the game if the result of Unsigncrypt(params,
The advantage of F I is defined as the probability that it wins. sUF-CMA-II: This is the game in which F II interacts with the "challenger": ) is not the ⊥ symbol. The advantage of F II is defined as the probability that it wins.
Definition 2. A CLSC scheme is said to be sUF-CMA-I secure (resp. sUF-CMA-II secure) if there is no PPT adversary F I (resp. F II ) which wins sUF-CMA-I (resp. sUF-CMA-II) with non-negligible advantage. A CLSC scheme is said to be sUF-CMA secure if it is both sUF-CMA-I secure and sUF-CMA-II secure.
Note that the adversary is allowed to extract the private key of ID * r in the above definition. Again, this condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of insider security for signcryption [3] .
Date Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM)
A DEM is a symmetric encryption scheme which consists of the following two algorithms.
-Enc: This algorithm takes as input 1 k , a key K and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} * , where K ∈ K DEM is a key in the given key space, and m is a bit string of arbitrary length. We denote this as c ← Enc(K, m). -Dec: This algorithm takes as input a key K and a ciphertext c, and outputs the message m ∈ {0, 1} * or a symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext is invalid.
For the purposes of this paper, it is only required that a DEM is secure with respect to indistinguishability against passive attackers (IND-PA). Formally, this security notion is captured by the following game played between a PPT adversary A and a challenger.
Initial: A runs on input 1 k and submits two equal length messages, m 0 and m 1 . Challenge: The challenger chooses a random key K ∈ K DEM as well as a random bit λ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends c * ← Enc(K, m λ ) to A as a challenge ciphertext.
Guess: The adversary A produces a bit λ and wins the game if λ = λ. The advantage of A is defined to be
where Pr[λ = λ] denotes the probability that λ = λ.
Definition 3.
A DEM is said to be IND-PA secure if there is no PPT adversary A which wins the above game with non-negligible advantage.
In this section, we extend the concept of signcryption tag-KEM to the certificateless setting. We give the formal definition for certificateless signcryption tag-KEM (CLSC-TKEM).
Generic Scheme
A generic CLSC-TKEM consists of the following seven algorithms.
-Setup: Same to CLSC described in Section 2.
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Same to CLSC described in Section 2.
-Generate-User-Keys: Same to CLSC described in Section 2.
-Set-Private-Key: Same to CLSC described in Section 2.
-Sym: This is symmetric key generation algorithm which takes as input the params, the sender's full private key S IDs , identity ID s and public key P K IDs , the receiver's identity ID r and public key P K IDr , and outputs a symmetric key K together with internal state information ω. Here K ∈ K CLSC−TKEM is a key in the space of possible session keys at a given security level. We denote this as (K, ω) ← Sym(params, S IDs , ID s , P K IDs , ID r , P K IDr ). -Encap: This is key encapsulation algorithm which takes as input the state information ω and an arbitrary tag τ , and returns an encapsulation ψ ∈ E CLSC−TKEM . We denote this as ψ ← Encap(ω, τ ). -Decap: This is decapsulation algorithm which takes as input the params, an encapsulation ψ, a tag τ , the sender's identity ID s and public key P K IDs , the receiver's full private key S IDr , identity ID r and public key P K IDr , and outputs a key K or a special symbol ⊥ indicating invalid encapsulation. We denote this as K ← Decap(params, ψ, τ, ID s , P K IDs , S IDr , ID r , P K IDr ).
We make the consistency constraint that if (K, ω) ← Sym(params, S IDs , ID s , P K IDs , ID r , P K IDr ) and ψ ← Encap(ω, τ ), then K ← Decap(params, ψ, τ, ID s , P K IDs , S IDr , ID r , P K IDr ).
Security Notions
A CLSC-TKEM should satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability. To define the security notions for CLSC-TKEM, we simply adapt the security notions of CLSC into the TKEM framework. Again there are two types of adversary against a CLSC-TKEM: Type I and Type II. A Type I adversary models an attacker which is a common user of the system and is not in possession of the KGC's master secret key. But it is able to adaptively replace users'public keys with (valid) public keys of its choice. A Type II adversary models an honest-but-curious KGC who knows the KGC's master secret key. But it cannot replace users' public keys.
-Extract partial private key: Same to CLSC's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 2.
-Extract private key: Same to CLSC's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 2.
-Request public key: Same to CLSC's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 2.
-Replace public key: Same to CLSC's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 2.
-Symmetric key generation queries: A I chooses a sender's identity ID s and a receiver's identity ID r . The challenger finds S IDs from its "query-answer" list and runs (K, ω) ← Sym(params, S IDs , ID s , P K IDs , ID r , P K IDr ). The challenger then stores the value ω (hidden from the view of the adversary, and overwriting any previously stored values), and sends the symmetric key K to A I . Note that, it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the sender's secret value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide it. We disallow queries where ID s = ID r . -Key encapsulation queries: A I produces an arbitrary tag τ . The challenger checks whether there exists a stored value ω. If not, it returns ⊥ and terminates. Otherwise it erases the value from storage and returns ψ ← Encap(ω, τ ) to A I . -Key decapsulation queries: The adversary A I chooses a sender's identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r , an encapsulation ψ, and a tag τ . The challenger finds S IDr from its "queryanswer" list and sends the result of Decap(params, ψ, τ, ID s , P K IDs , S IDr , ID r , P K IDr ) to A I . Note that, it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the receiver's secret value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide it. We also disallow queries where ID s = ID r .
Challenge: The adversary A I decides when Phase 1 ends. A I generates a sender's identity ID * s and a receiver's identity ID * r on which it wishes to be challenged. Note that ID * r should not be queried to extract a private key in Phase 1. Note also that ID * r cannot be equal to an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has been extracted. The challenger computes (
. Then the challenger chooses K 0 ← K CLSC−TKEM and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and sends K b to A I . When A I receives K b , it may ask the same queries as previously. Then A I generates a tag τ * . The challenger computes ψ * ← Encap(ω * , τ * ) and sends it to A I as a challenge encapsulation.
Phase 2: The adversary A I can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase 1. The same rule is applied here: A I cannot extract the private key for ID * r . A I cannot extract the partial private key for ID * r if the public key of this identity has been replaced before the challenge phase. In addition, A I cannot make a decapsulation query on (K b , ψ * ) under ID * s and ID * r , unless the public key P K ID * IND-CCA2-II: This is the game in which A II interacts with the "challenger": Initial: The challenger runs (params, msk) ← Setup(1 k ) and gives both params and msk to A II .
-Symmetric key generation queries: Same to CLSC-TKEM's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 3. -Key encapsulation queries: Same to CLSC-TKEM's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 3. -Key decapsulation queries: Same to CLSC-TKEM's IND-CCA2-I game described in Section 3.
Challenge: The adversary A II decides when Phase 1 ends. A II generates a sender's identity ID * s and a receiver's identity ID * r on which it wishes to be challenged. Note that ID * r should not be queried to extract a private key in Phase 1. The challenger runs (
. Then the challenger chooses K 0 ← K CLSC−TKEM and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and sends K b to A I . When A II receives K b , it may ask the same queries as previously. Then A II generates a tag τ * . The challenger computes ψ * ← Encap(ω * , τ * ) and sends it to A II as a challenge encapsulation.
Phase 2: The adversary A II can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase 1. A II cannot extract the private key for ID * r . In addition, A II cannot make a decapsulation query on (K b , ψ * ) under ID * s and ID * r , unless the public key P K ID * Notice that the adversary is allowed to extract the private key of ID * s in the IND-CCA2-I and IND-CCA2-II games. This condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of insider security for confidentiality of signcryption [3] . On the other hand, it ensures the forward security of the scheme, i.e. confidentiality is preserved in case the sender's private key becomes compromised.
For the strong existential unforgeability, we consider two games "sUF-CMA-I" and "sUF-CMA-II" where a Type I adversary F I and a Type II adversary F II interact with their "challenger" in these two games, respectively. Note that the challenger keeps a history of "query-answer" while interacting with the attackers. Now we describe the two games.
Attack: The adversary F I performs a polynomially bounded number of queries just like in the CLSC-TKEM's IND-CCA2-I game.
Forgery: F I produces a quaternion (τ * , ψ * , ID * s , ID * r ). Note that ID * s should not be queried to extract a private key. Note also that ID * s cannot be equal to an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has been extracted. In addition, ψ * was not returned by the key encapsulation oracle on the input (τ * , ID ) is not the ⊥ symbol. The advantage of F II is defined as the probability that it wins.
Definition 5. A CLSC-TKEM scheme is said to be sUF-CMA-I secure (resp. sUF-CMA-II secure) if there is no PPT adversary F I (resp. F II ) which wins sUF-CMA-I (resp. sUF-CMA-II) with nonnegligible advantage. A CLSC-TKEM scheme is said to be sUF-CMA secure if it is both sUF-CMA-I secure and sUF-CMA-II secure.
Certificateless Hybrid Signcryption
We can combine a CLSC-TKEM with a DEM to form a CLSC scheme. We describe it in Figure 1 . Note that the tag is the ciphertext output by the DEM. Such construction yields simpler scheme descriptions and better generic security reductions.
We give the security results for such construction in Theorems 1 and 2. 2. Output the system parameters params and the master secret key msk CLSC.Partial-Private-Key-Extract: On input the params, msk, and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * :
1. DID ← CLSC-TKEM.Partial-Private-Key-Extract(params, msk, ID)
2. Output the partial private key DID of the identity ID CLSC.Generate-User-Keys: On input the params and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * :
1. (xID, P KID) ← CLSC-TKEM.Generate-User-Keys(params, ID)
2. Output the secret value xID and the public key P KID of the identity ID CLSC.Set-Private-Key: On input the partial private key DID and the secret value xID:
2. Output the full private key SID CLSC.Signcrypt: On input the params, a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the sender's full private key SID s , identity IDs and public key P KID s , the receiver's identity IDr and public key P KID r :
CLSC.Unsigncrypt: On input the params, a ciphertext σ, the sender's identity IDs and public key P KID s , the receiver's full private key SID r , identity IDr and public key P KID r :
1. K ←CLSC-TKEM.Decap(params, ψ, c, IDs, P KID s , SID r , IDr, P KID r ) Proof. See the appendix B.
An Example of CLSC-TKEM
The Barbosa-Farshim CLSC scheme [6] fits the new generic framework. Here we give an example of CLSC-TKEM based on the Barbosa-Farshim scheme. If we combine the CLSC-TKEM with a DEM as Figure 1 , we can get a scheme that is very similar to the Barbosa-Farshim scheme. Since the Barbosa-Farshim scheme uses the bilinear pairings, we describe some basic knowledge about bilinear pairings in the appendix C.
CLSC-TKEM
The CLSC-TKEM consists of the following seven algorithms.
-Setup: Define G 1 , G 2 andê as in appendix C. Let H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , and H 4 be four cryptographic hash functions where
Here n is the key length of a DEM. Let P be a generator of G 1 . The PKG chooses a master secret key s ∈ Z * q randomly and computes P pub ← sP . The PKG publishes system parameters {G 1 , G 2 , n,ê, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } and keeps the master key s secret.
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Given an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the PKG computes Q ID ← H 1 (ID) and returns the partial private key D ID ← sQ ID . -Generate-User-Keys: A user with identity ID chooses a random element x ID from Z q as the secret value, and sets P K ID ← x ID P as the public key. -Set-Private-Key: Given a partial private key D ID and a secret value x ID , this algorithm returns the full private key S ID ← (x ID , D ID ). -Sym: Given the sender's full private key S IDs , identity ID s and public key P K IDs , the receiver's identity ID r and public key P K IDr , this algorithm works as follows.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Our proof strategy is as follows. We define a sequence Game 0 , Game 1 , Game 2 of modified attack games. The only difference between games is how the environment responds to A's oracle queries. Let σ * ← (ψ * , c * ) be the challenge ciphertext submitted to A by its challenge oracle that encrypts either m 0 or m 1 according to a bit b. Let K * denote the symmetric key used by the challenge oracle in the generation of the challenge ciphertext, or alternatively, the decapsulation of ψ * using the identities ID * s and ID * r that are chosen by the adversary. For any i = 0, 1, 2, we let S i be the event that δ = δ in game Game i , where δ is the bit chosen by A's challenge oracle and δ is the bit output by A. This probability is taken over the random choices of A and those of A's oracles.
We will use the following useful Lemma 1 from [37] .
Lemma 1. Let E, E , and F be events defined on a probability space such that
Game 0 : We simulate the view of the adversary in a real attack by running the suitable key generation algorithms and using the resulting keys to respond to A's queries. So the view of A is the same as it would be in a real attack. Therefore, we have
where i ∈ {I, II}. Game 1 : In this game, we slightly modify how the unsigncryption oracle responds to queries from A. When a sender' identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r , and (ψ, c) is presented to the unsigncryption oracle after the invocation of the challenge signcryption oracle, if ID s = ID * s , ID r = ID * r and ψ = ψ * , and in the case of a Type I adversary, the public keys of ID * s and ID * r have not been replaced, then the unsigncryption oracle does not use the genuine unsigncryption procedure for the hybrid scheme, instead it uses the key K * to decrypt c and returns the result to the adversary A. Clearly this change has no impact on the adversary and so
Game 2 : In this game, we modify Game 1 by replacing K * with a random key K from K DEM . The result then follows from the following Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. There exists a PPT algorithm B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
where i ∈ {I, II}.
Proof.
To prove this we demonstrate how to construct an adversary B 1 of the CLSC-TKEM to violate the IND-CCA2-I (resp. IND-CCA2-II) attack. Adversary B 1 is constructed by running adversary A. We respond to A's queries as follows.
-When A calls any oracle, bar its signcryption, unsigncryption and challenge signcryption oracles, B 1 simply relays these queries to its own equivalent oracle. -When A make a signcryption query with a sender's identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r and a plaintext m, B 1 follows the steps below. 1. Make a symmetric key generation query on (ID s , ID r ) to its own symmetric key generation oracle to obtain K. 2. Compute c ← DEM.Enc(K, m). 3. Make a key encapsulation query on c to its own key encapsulation oracle to obtain ψ. 4. Return the ciphertext σ ← (ψ, c) to A.
-When A make a unsigncryption query with a sender's identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r and a ciphertext σ ← (ψ, c), B 1 follows the steps below. 1. Make a key decapsulation query on (ψ, c, ID s , ID r ) to its own key decapsulation oracle to obtain K. sender's identity ID * s , and a receiver's identity ID * r , B 1 follows the steps below. 1. Submit ID * s and ID * r to its challenger to obtain K b , where b ∈ {0, 1}. 2. Pick a random bit δ from {0, 1}. 3. Compute c * ← DEM.Enc(K b , m δ ). 4. Submit c * to its challenger to obtain ψ * . 5. Return the ciphertext σ * ← (ψ * , c * ) to A.
-To respond to A's unsigncryption query for a sender's identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r and a ciphertext σ ← (ψ, c) after A has queried its challenge signcryption oracle, B 1 proceeds as follows.
• If (ID s , ID r , ψ) = (ID * s , ID * r , ψ * ) then it uses the same procedure that it used before A's call to its challenge signcryption oracle.
• In the case of a Type I adversary against a CLSC scheme, if (ID s , ID r , ψ) = (ID * s , ID * r , ψ * ) and the public keys have been replaced, then B 1 responds by calling the key decapsulation oracle provided to it by A with input (ID * s , ID * r , ψ * , c * ) to obtain K. It then uses K to decrypt c and relays the response to A.
• Otherwise, B 1 uses K b to decrypt c and relays the result to A. Lemma 3. There exists a PPT algorithm B 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
Proof. To construct such a B 2 we simply run A as it would be run in game Game 2 . We run the suitable CLSC-TKEM algorithms so we can respond to A's queries before it calls its challenge signcryption oracle. When A calls its challenge signcryption oracle with a sender's identity ID * s , a receiver's identity ID * r , and messages (m 0 , m 1 ), we simply relay (m 0 , m 1 ) to the challenge encryption oracle of B 2 to obtain c * . We then make a symmetric key generation query and a key encapsulation query to obtain K * and ψ * , respectively. We discard K * and return (ψ * , c * ) to A. We continue to respond to A's queries as before except if it a makes unsigncryption query on (ID * s , ID * r , ψ * , c) for some c. In this instance there are two cases:
-If we are dealing with a Type I adversary A of a CLSC scheme, and the public keys have been replaced, then B 2 decapsulates (ID * s , ID * r , ψ * , c) using the provided secret key to obtain K, decrypts c and relays the response to A. -Otherwise we query B 2 's decryption oracle with c and relay the response to A.
In this simulation A is run by B 2 in exactly the same manner as the former would be run in game Game 2 ; moreover, Pr[S 2 ] corresponds exactly to the probability that B 2 correctly determines the hidden bit of its challenge encryption oracle since B 2 outputs whatever A outputs. The result follows.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose that F is an adversary that breaks the CLSC scheme with probability Adv sUF−CMA−i CLSC (F), where i ∈ {I, II}. We use this to construct an algorithm B that breaks the sUF-CMA-i for the CLSC-TKEM with probability at least Adv sUF−CMA−i CLSC (F) too. Adversary B is constructed by running adversary F. We respond to F's queries as follows.
-When F calls any oracle, bar its signcryption and unsigncryption oracles, B simply relays these queries to its own equivalent oracle. -When F make a signcryption query with a sender's identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r and a plaintext m, B follows the steps below. 1. Make a symmetric key generation query on (ID s , ID r ) to its own symmetric key generation oracle to obtain K. 2. Compute c ← DEM.Enc(K, m). 3. Make a key encapsulation query on c to its own key encapsulation oracle to obtain ψ. 4. Return the ciphertext σ ← (ψ, c) to F.
-When F make a unsigncryption query with a sender's identity ID s , a receiver's identity ID r and a ciphertext σ ← (ψ, c), B follows the steps below. 1. Make a key decapsulation query on (ψ, c, ID s , ID r ) to its own key decapsulation oracle to obtain K. Finally, F outputs a forgery (m * , σ * , ID * s , ID * r ), where (ψ * , c * ) ← σ * . B outputs (τ * , ψ * , ID * s , ID * r ), where τ * = c * .
Clearly, this algorithm perfectly simulates the environment in which F should be running. If F wins the sUF-CMA-i for the CLSC, B have the same probability to win the sUF-CMA-i for CLSC-TKEM.
C Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity:ê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 , a, b ∈ Z q . 2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P and Q ∈ G 1 such thatê(P, Q) = 1. 3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P ,Q ∈ G 1 .
The modified Weil pairing and the Tate pairing [10] are admissible maps of this kind. The security of our scheme described here relies on the hardness of the following problems.
Definition 6. We say the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) assumption holds if the advantage of any PPT adversary as defined below is negligible.
Adv GBDH (A, q DBDH ) = Pr[T =ê(P, P ) abc |a, b, c ← Z q ; T ← A O (P, aP, bP, cP )]
In the above equation, O denotes a decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman oracle which on input (P, aP, bP, cP, T ) outputs 1 if T =ê(P, P ) abc and 0 otherwise. By q DBDH we denote the maximum number of queries that A asks its decision oracle.
The following weaker assumption is implied by the above.
Definition 7.
We say the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the presence of a decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman oracle (GDH ) holds in G 1 if the advantage of any PPT adversary as defined below is negligible.
Adv GDH (A, q DBDH ) = Pr[Q = abP |a, b ← Z q ; Q ← A O (P, aP, bP )]
Here O and q DBDH are as in the above definition.
This assumption in turn implies:
Definition 8. We say the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds in G 1 if the advantage of any PPT adversary as defined below is negligible.
Adv CDH (A) = Pr[Q = abP |a, b ← Z q ; Q ← A(P, aP, bP )]
D Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. In the Barbosa-Farshim CLSC scheme [6] , they use a weaker formulation of Type I adversary which they refer to as Type I . In confidentiality games, the Type I adversary is not allowed to extract the partial private key of ID * r . They proved that If a CLSC scheme is IND-CCA2 secure against Type II and Type I attackers, then it is also IND-CCA2 secure against Type I attackers. It is easy to extend this conclusion to CLSC-TKEM setting. That is, we have the following Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If a CLSC-TKEM is IND-CCA2 secure against Type II and Type I attackers then it is also IND-CCA2 secure against Type I attackers. In particular, we have
